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Abstract
This paper addresses the question of delegation in an organization where there
is an initial asymmetry of information between the principal and the agent. We
assume that the principal cannot use revelation techniques µ a la Baron Myerson to
elicit agent's superior information and in contrast, we posit that the decision and the
state of the world parameter cannot be contracted for. With these simple contracts,
we show that delegation is an alternative to contracting to elicit agent's information.
We can show that delegated decisions completely reveal the state of the world to the
principal. Therefore the principal can extract agent's information by giving up the
control right over some decisions. As the organization takes a sequence of decisions,
the information learned by the principal can be used for the other decisions. So
delegation is only partial: the principal delegates some decisions and keeps control
over other.
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This paper addresses the question of delegation in a principal-agent setting with asym-
metric information. We develop the idea that the principal may ¯nd an advantage in
delegating decisions to the better informed agent1 in order to acquire information. By
contrast to other papers, we show that the information is not transmitted through reve-
lation contracts but through delegated decisions. And hence, delegation is an alternative
to contracts to transfer information within organizations.
In the literature2, the trade o® between delegation and centralization is often a simple
trade o® between loss of control associated with delegation and informational bene¯ts
when the delegated is better informed than his supervisor.
Loss of control comes from diverging interests between the principal and the agent(s).
When the principal gives some power to the agent, he implements his preferred decision
rather than the principal's one.
Bene¯ts of a delegated structure could be a better communication (Melumad, Mookher-
jee and Reichelstein [1992]), a better ability to prevent collusion (La®ont Martimort [1998]
and Felli [1996]), an informed decider (Legros [1993], Dessein [1999]) or increased incen-
tives provided to the agent (Aghion and Tirole [1997]).
In this paper, we show that delegation is useful to reduce the initial asymmetry of
information between the principal and the agent and that delegation can play the same
role as complete contracts.
To show that, we model an organization composed of one principal and one agent.
The organization should take a sequence of (two) decisions a®ected by a common state of
the world parameter. There is an initial asymmetry of information between the principal
and the subordinate agent: the agent knows the state of the world parameter while the
principal has only some prior about its distribution. Moreover, we assume that the agent
and the principal have diverging interests3. They disagree on the choice of the optimal
decisions.
We assume that the principal cannot use revelation techniques µ a la Baron Myerson to
elicit agent's superior information. In contrast, we adopt an incomplete contract frame-
work (Grossman and Hart [1986], Hart and Moore [1990], Hart [1995] and Tirole [1999])
and posit that the decisions and the state of the world parameter cannot be contracted
for, neither ex-ante nor ex-post. Therefore, the remaining contracting variable is the allo-
cation of decision rights. The only feasible contract is to decide who is in charge of each
decision.
1We will refer as 'she' for the principal and 'he' for the agent.
2In the standard principal agent theory, following the revelation principle (Myerson, [1982]), delegation
is always weakly dominated by a grand contract between the principal and all the agents. To speak about
delegation in a principal agent setting, one needs to relax some assumption of the revelation principle.
Melumad, Mookherjee and Reichelstein [1992] relax the assumption of perfect communication between
the principal and the agent, Felli [1996] relaxes the assumption of in¯nitely costly communication between
agents, in order to allow collusion. La®ont and Martimort [1998] assume that communication between
the principal and the agents is imperfect and that side contracting between agents is feasible. Aghion
and Tirole [1997] and this paper assume that the contracts are incomplete.
3In the ¯nancial literature for example, it is often assumed that managers have a preference for empire
(Jensen [1986], Harris and Raviv [1998]).
2Focusing on that simple contract is a convenient way to study how the agent's decision
can signal his information to the principal. After observing the agent's decision (if he
has power to decide), the principal revises her prior about the state of the world and
use this new information to take subsequent decisions. Using an appropriate equilibrium
re¯nement, Cho and Kreps [1987] intuitive criterion, we can show that delegated decisions
completely reveal the state of the world to the principal. Therefore the principal can
extract agent's information by giving up the control right over some decisions. As the
organization takes a sequence of decisions, the information learned by the principal can
be used for the other decisions. So delegation is only partial: the principal delegates some
decisions and keeps control over other.
Using the properties of signaling games, we show that delegation plays the same role
as complete contract: it transfers perfectly information from the agent to the principal. If
the result is the same, the two mechanisms work di®erently: when the principal contracts
with the agent, information is transmitted through a report by the agent and the agent is
rewarded according to the contract and his report. When the principal delegates decision,
the information is transmitted through decision. By observing agent's choice, the principal
becomes informed about the agent's private information. We establish this property of
delegation by using the results of the signaling game literature.
This result should be contrasted with the results of the literature on dynamic incentive
contracts4 where there can be pooling (information revelation is delayed). In our delegated
mechanism, the separating equilibrium emerges as the sole surviving equilibrium and so
there is no delay in information revelation5.
Delegation is costly for the principal: as the agent doesn't share her preferences, dele-
gation entails loss of control. And these can be high relative to the bene¯ts of delegation.
So delegation does not always emerge as the optimal organizational form.
Last, we try to see how the principal can limit the use (or abuse) of the decision right by
the agent by imposing some rules that constraint the choice of the subordinate agent. We
analyses rules that take the form of a limitation of the agents' subset of actions. In most
case, a rule is useful tool to mitigate the losses of control but it has some limits. These
limits are the requirement that the delegated decision remains informative (the principal
should learn something by observing it) and that the rule doesn't constraint the agent to
quit the organization (he must receive at least his reservation utility). Within these limits,
we describe what is in our framework an optimal rule. Even if the principal can restrict
the agent's discretion, she cannot suppress all the costs associated with delegation.
There are several papers related to ours. Aghion and Tirole [1997], study the rational
for delegation in a structure where the asymmetry of information between the principal
and the agent is endogenous. They show that giving authority to the subordinate increases
his incentive to be informed, which in turn increases his e®ective control over decisions
(sometimes at the expense of the principal). The trade o® studied by these authors is
between loss of control and the agent's increased initiative under delegation. Another
paper that studies the rationale for delegation in an incomplete contract set up is Dessein
[1999]. He shows that the trade o® between delegation and no delegation, where the
4Freixas Guesnerie and Tirole [1985], La®ont and Tirole [1988]
5This di®erence comes from the fact that the principal can perfectly commit to the second period
contract by giving up the right to decide to the agent for the ¯rst decision only.
3agent only communicates some information to the principal, is a trade o® between loss
of control and loss of information. Under delegation, the decision is based on perfect
information but take by an agent who doesn't share organization's preferences, while
under no delegation, there is no bias in the decision but the information transmitted by
the agent is noisy (µ a la Crawford Sobel): the principal doesn't learn the state of the world
from the message transmitted by the agent but only improves her prior. In Legros [1993],
at each period the principal delegates the choice of a policy to an agent with unknown
preference. While taking a decision, the delegate trades o® the immediate gain of taking
his preferred decision (or a decision close to his preferred one) and the information about
his preferences transmitted through the decision to the principal. This information is
important because it a®ects the probability of being chosen as a delegate for the next
period. By contrast to this paper, Legros shows that, when there is an asymmetry of
information about preferences, the decisions cannot be completely informative and there
is some bunching between types.
The paper is organized as follow: in the next section, we present the model. In section
3, we describe the equilibrium decisions under the di®erent organizational forms. We look,
in section 4, at the costs and bene¯ts of delegation. In section 5, we describe how the
principal may restrain the agent's discretionary power, and how this a®ects the outcome
of the game. Section 6 discusses some extensions and section 7 concludes.
2 Model
We model an organization composed of one principal and one agent. This organization
takes a sequence of two decisions (labeled d1 and d2) These decisions a®ect the welfare of
both organization's members6. The utility of the principal and the agent are also a®ected
by a common environmental parameter µ. This parameter is constant over periods78.
Contractual restrictions In this model, the only contracting variable is the allocation
of decision rights over d1 and d2. These decision rights are allocated by the principal at
the beginning of the ¯rst period either to herself or to the agent9. These contractual
restrictions are consistent with the incomplete contract view of organizations. Giving
authority to a subordinate agent is giving the right to select a decision from an allowed
set (see Simon [1958], Grossman and Hart [1986], Hart and Moore [1990], Aghion and
Tirole [1997]).
6Even if there is no dynamic in the model, we will sometimes refer to d1 as the ¯rst period decision
and d2 as the second period decision.
7This is a simpli¯cation. We can alternatively assume that the state of the world changes over periods
and that there is some correlation between the state of the world in the two periods. In this case, the
results of the paper remains qualitatively the same. The important assumption is that the observation of
the ¯rst decision (under delegation) improves the information about the state of the world in the second
period.
8This is a common assumption in dynamic models of incentive contracts (La®ont and Tirole [1988])
9The fact that the principal initially possess decision rights over both decisions can be justi¯ed by
ownership of physical assets that confers the right to decide about their use (Grossman and Hart [1986])
or by institutional agreement, as it is the case in political decisions (Aghion and Tirole [1997]).
4Environmental parameter We assume that the agent knows the "state of the world".
This environmental parameter a®ects the utility of both the principal and the agent. The
state of the world is drawn out of a set £ from a common knowledge distribution F(µ).
For simplicity, we assume10 that £ = fµ1;µ 2g, with µ1 <µ 2and we call ¢µ = µ2¡µ1.T h e
probability that µ equals µ1 is denoted v1, the probability of µ = µ2 equals v2 =1¡v 1.
Decisions The choice of a decision represents the choice of a project implemented by
the organization. The project is one dimensional. We suppose that there is a continuum
of possible decisions given by ]0;+1[:
Utility functions We assume that the agent and the principal have Euclidian prefer-
ences: they have a preferred project d1 and d2 and their utility is a quadratic function of
the distance between their preferred project and the selected project. More precisely, we
assume that the utility of the agent is:
U






The utility of the principal is:
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These utility functions exhibit three characteristics: ¯rst, the divergence of interest be-
tween the principal and the agent is measured by the di®erent private bene¯t associated
with each decision: ®idi and ¯idi, i =1 ;2. These private bene¯ts are measured in mon-
etary units. Second, the cost is state dependent and identical for the principal and the
agent. The cost of implementing a decision di in state µ is:
(µ¡di)2
2 . Third, these functions
are single peaked in each decision. The single peak assumption implies that the utility of
the agent and the principal achieves a unique maximum in each decision for di equals to
respectively ®i+µ and ¯i+µ. A high µ pushes up the ideal point of both the principal and




¯2 measure the relative importance of d1 over d2 for the agent and the principal11.
Note that these utility functions satisfy (trivially) the single crossing property.
Agent's participation: individual rationality After learning µ and the allocation
of decision rights (the organizational form), the agent has the possibility of quitting the
organization. We assume that the agent has an outside opportunity that gives him a
utility level normalized to zero. If the agent refuses to participate in the organization, it
shuts down and both the principal and the agent get a zero payo®. A simple way to force
the participation of the agent when d1 and d2 are such that UA(µ;d1;d 2)<0i st op a yt o
the agent an unconditional wage W such that: UA(µ;d1;d 2)+W = 0. In this case, only ex
ante e±cient organizations, organizations such that the total welfare (ex ante) is positive
10The two states of the world framework simpli¯es the signalling game between, the principal and the
agent without making it trivial. The model is extended to N types in section 7.
11Assuming that these ratios are di®erent from one, helps us to identify more clearly in the analysis
the in°uence of the ¯rst and the second decision.
5(EUP + UA ¸ 0), are carried out. For the remaining of the paper we assume that the
private bene¯ts associated with decisions are large enough and we ignore participation
constraints.
Timing of events The timing of decisions is as follow:
² The principal allocates decision rights.
² The agent observes the state of the world.
² The agent decides to stay within the organization or quit it.
² The ¯rst decision d1 is taken (and observed)
² The second decision d2 is taken
² Payo®s are realized and collected
3 Equilibrium decisions
We assume that the only contracting variable is the allocation of decision rights over d1
and d2. There are four possible allocations of decisions right: centralization, delegation,
complete delegation and second period delegation. We call centralization the case in
which the principal keeps the decision rights over both decisions, delegation (or ¯rst
period delegation) the case in which the better informed agent receives the decision right
over d1; complete delegation is the allocation of both decision rights to the agent and
second period delegation is the allocation of d1 to the principal and d2 to the agent. This
section describes the outcome of the game under these four organizational forms.
3.1 Centralization
Under centralization, the principal does not know the state of the world µ till the end of
the game and the realization of costs. She therefore takes decisions that are not contingent
on the value of µ. These decisions are chosen in order to maximize the principal's expected
utility and are given by the following equations:
d1 = v1µ1 + v2µ2 + ¯1 = Eµ+¯1 (1)
d2 = v1µ1 + v2µ2 + ¯2 = Eµ+¯2 (2)
3.2 Delegation
When the principal delegates d1 to the agent, she observes agent's decision before choosing
d2. This observation imposes a revision of her prior believes about the distribution of the
state of the world parameter µ: The game played by the principal and the agent is a
standard signalling game. The equilibrium concept used in this kind of game is the
Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE).
























and ¹(d1) are the posterior distribution of µ after the principal has observed d1. These
posterior beliefs are computed with Bayes rule.
This kind of game usually has multiple equilibria. We use the intuitive criterion (Cho-
Kreps, [1987] ) to select among all the possible equilibria.












with at least one strict inequality.
In the remaining of this section, we describe the outcome of the signalling game played
by the principal and the agent when the principal delegates d1. The di±culty of this
task comes from the fact the game is a non standard one and incentive constraints can
go in both direction . We start by describing the separating equilibria, after we analyze
the pooling equilibria. For convenience, part of the analysis has been relegated to an
appendix. Our results are summarized in proposition 1.




























In a separating equilibrium, the equilibrium beliefs are: ¹(µ1jd¤
1(µ1)) = 1;¹(µ 1jd ¤
1(µ 2)) =










































7To characterize the separating equilibrium, we have to identify the relevant incentive
constraint. The right hand side (RHS) of IC0
i represents the bene¯ts12 for type µi of
mimicking the type µj; i;j =1 ;2. There are 3 possible cases:
Case S.1: the RHS of IC0
1 is positive (®2 ¡¯2 ¡ ¢µ
2 ¸ 0), in this case, the utility of µ1
increases if he acts as µ2. This expression simply means that ¯2 + µ2 is closest to ®2 + µ1
than ¯2 + µ1 and ceteris paribus, agent µ1 prefers d¤
1(µ2).
Case S1: ®2 ¡ ¯2 ¸ ¢µ
2
®2 + µ1 ®2 + µ2
¯2 + µ1 ¯2 + µ2
Case S.2: The RHS of IC0
2 is positive (¯2 ¡®2 ¡ ¢µ
2 ¸ 0), in this case, the utility of µ2
increases if he acts as µ1.
Case S2: ¯2 ¡ ®2 ¸ ¢µ
2
®2 + µ1 ®2 + µ2
¯2 + µ1 ¯2 + µ2
Case S.3: Both RHS are negative which means that no type has an incentive to
misrepresent his type13.
Case S3: j¯2 ¡ ®2j·¢ µ
2
® 2+µ 1 ® 2+µ 2
¯ 2+µ 1 ¯ 2+µ 2
Case S.1: Suppose that ®2 ¡ ¯2 ¡ ¢µ
2 ¸ 0. The set of separating equilibrium is:
d
¤
1(µ1)=® 1 + µ 1 (4)
d
¤
1(µ2) 2 D ´f d 1( µ 2) j IC
0
1;IR 2g (5)
This equilibrium is supported by pessimistic beliefs: ¹(µ1jd1)=1 ; 8d 1 6 =d ¤
1 ( µ 2 ) and
¹(µ1jd¤
1(µ2)) = 0.
The set D is the set of decisions that satisfy the participation constraint for type µ2
and the constraint IC0
1. Ignoring IR2, the set D ´]0;® 1+µ 1¡
p
K 1][[® 1+µ 1+
p
K 1;+1[;
K1 =( 2 ® 2¡2 ¯ 2¡¢ µ )¢µ.
Now we us the intuitive criterion to select one equilibrium in D. Consider a deviation
by µ2 from d¤
1(µ2)t od 12D . By de¯nition of the set D, such a deviation can bene¯t the
agent only in state µ2. Therefore, the intuitive criterion imposes that the beliefs associated
with d1 2 D should be updated to ¹(µ1jd1 2 D)=0 .
12By bene¯ts, we mean the di®erence in UA(µi) when the principal chooses d2 = ¯2 + µj rather than
d2 = ¯2 + µi.
13It is impossible to have the two incentive constraints relevant at the same time. This comes from the
single crossing property of the utility function.
8And hence, a rational agent µ2 will select his preferred decision within D. The only
equilibrium surviving the intuitive criterion is: d¤




K 1=® 1+µ 2+(
p
K1¡¢µ) otherwise. In the ¯rst case, ®1+µ2 2 D14,
in the second case, d¤
1(µ2) is the decision closest to ®1 + µ2 within D15.
The cases S.2 and S.3 which are similar to S.1 are relegated to appendix A.1.
To sum up our ¯nding, in the case of separating equilibria, there is only one equilibrium
that survives the intuitive criterion. This equilibrium is what is called the least costly
separating equilibrium (LCS). Now let's turn to the case of pooling equilibria.
Pooling equilibria In a pooling equilibrium: d¤
1(µ1)=d ¤
1=d ¤
1( µ 2), ¹(µ1jd¤
1)=v 1and
then d¤
2 = Eµ + ¯2. To de¯ne the set of pooling equilibria, we have to de¯ne out-of-
equilibrium beliefs that support the equilibrium. To do this, we distinguish three cases:
In case P.1, regarding the second decision, the agent µ1 prefers the pooling decision
d2 = ¯2+Eµ to the signalling decision d2 = ¯2+µ1. We are in case P.1 when the distance
between ®2 + µ1 and ¯2 + Eµ is smaller than the distance between ®2 + µ1 and ¯2 + µ1.
This condition is met when (i) ®2 + µ1 ¸ ¯2 + Eµ or when (ii) ®2 + µ1 · ¯2 + Eµ and
®2 ¡ ¯2 ¸ v2¢µ
2 .W h e nµ 1prefers the pooling decision, µ2 prefers the separating decision
¯2+µ2 to the pooling solution because, the conditions (i) and (ii) could be satis¯ed only if
®2 >¯ 2but then ®2 +µ2 >¯ 2+µ 2>¯ 2+Eµ. Then, in case P.1, the pooling equilibrium




¯2 + µ1 ¯2 + Eµ
In case P.2, the agent µ2 prefers pooling decision d¤
2 to the separating decision ¯2 +µ2.
The case P.2 corresponds to the conditions: (i) ®2+µ2 · ¯2+Eµ or (ii) ®2+µ2 ¸ ¯2+Eµ
and ¯2 ¡ ®2 ¸ v1¢µ
2 .I f µ 2prefers the pooling decision, µ1 prefers the separating. The
argument is the same as in P.1: to have (i) or (ii) satis¯ed, one needs ¯2 >® 2but then
®2 + µ1 >¯ 2+µ 1>¯ 2+Eµ. Then in case P.2, the pooling equilibrium is supported by




¯2 + Eµ ¯2 +µ2
In case P.3, both agents prefer the signalling decision to the pooling decision. In case P.3,
the pooling equilibrium is supported by passive beliefs: ¹(µ1jd1)=v 1.
Case P.3
®2 + µ1 ®2 + µ2
¯2 + µ1 ¯2 + µ2
¯2 + Eµ
14Notice that ®1+µ2 2 D if the costs of mimicking µ2 for µ1 (which are the lost utility when µ1 chooses
d1(µ1)=® 1+µ 2instead of d1(µ1)=® 1+µ 1 ) are greater than the bene¯ts given by the RHS of IC0
1:
These costs of mimicking are ¢µ
2
2 ; and they are greater than bene¯ts if ®2 ¡ ¯2 · ¢µ:
15At that solution, the other incentive constraint (IC0
2) is satis¯ed with slack.
9Now we describe the equilibrium in the three cases and we apply the intuitive criterion.
Case P.1: the set of pooling equilibria is the set of d¤















A(µ 2;d 1;d 2 =¯ 2+µ 1) (7)
Using these two conditions, we can de¯ne the set D of pooling equilibria. The condition
(6) is satis¯ed for all d1 if it is satis¯ed for d1 = ®1 + µ1. Condition (6) is equivalent to:
d¤
1 2 D1 ´ [®1 + µ1 ¡
p
A;®1 + µ1 +
p
A]; where A = v2¢µ(2®2 ¡ 2¯2 ¡ v2¢µ): Condition
(7) is satis¯ed for all d1 if it is satis¯ed for d1 = ®1 + µ2. (7) becomes: d¤
1 2 D2 ´
[®1 + µ2 ¡
p
B;®1 + µ2 +
p
B]; where B = v2¢µ(2®2 ¡ 2¯2 +( 1+v 1)¢µ). The set of
pooling equilibria is de¯ned as16: d¤
1 2 D ´ D1 \ D2:
Now we use the intuitive criterion to suppress all the pooling equilibria.
Lemma 1 8 d¤
1, 9 ~ d1 such that:
(i) µ1 prefers the pooling equilibrium d¤
1 to ~ d1, whatever the beliefs associated with ~ d1
(ii) µ2 prefers ~ d1 to the pooling equilibrium if the principal is convicted that ¹(µ1j~ d1)=0 .
The proof of this lemma is relegated to an appendix.
Then, if µ1 will never deviate to ~ d1, the beliefs associated with ~ d1 should be (according
to the intuitive criterion): ¹(µ1j~ d1) = 0. But with these updated beliefs, the agent µ2
prefers to quit the pooling equilibrium (part (ii) of the lemma). And hence, the initial
equilibrium d¤
1 does not survive the intuitive criterion.
Cases P.2 and P.3 which are similar to P.1 are relegated to appendix A.2.
From our previous discussion, we can establish that:
Proposition 1 The only equilibrium that survives the intuitive criterion is the least costly
separating (LCS) equilibrium17.
The LCS equilibrium is:
d2(µ)=¯ 2+µ (8)
If ¢µ ¸j ® 2¡¯ 2j
d 1( µ )=® 1+µ (9)
If ®2 ¡ ¯2 ¸ ¢µ
d1(µ1)=® 1 + µ 1 (10)
d1(µ2)=® 1 + µ 2 +(
q
K 1¡¢ µ) (11)
Where K1 =( 2 ® 2¡2 ¯ 2¡¢ µ )¢µ
16As B is greater than A,i ft h es e tDis non empty, its upper bound is given by ®1 + µ1 +
p
A.
17This equilibrium is often referred to the Riley [1979] outcome.
10If ¯2 ¡ ®2 ¸ ¢µ
d1(µ1)=® 1 + µ 1 ¡ (
q
K 2 ¡ ¢ µ ) (12)
d1(µ2)=® 1 + µ 2 (13)
Where K2 =( 2 ¯ 2¡2 ® 2¡¢ µ )¢µ
In the remaining of the paper we will call the ¯rst case 'free lunch' signal and the other
'costly signaling' cases.
This ¯rst proposition is the central result of the paper. It establishes that using the
properties of signalling games, delegation is going together with a transfer of information
from the agent to the principal. When the contracts are incomplete, the principal can still
extract information from the agent by delegating the choice of some decision. Observing
delegated decision is enough for the principal to learn agent's hidden information. When
the principal allocates decision rights to the agent, he is forced to reveal his information
through decisions. Proposition 1 establishes that delegating d1 suppress the asymmetric
information between the principal and the agent. In the next section, we show that such
a delegation has bene¯ts as well as costs and that even if it reduces the information
asymmetry it is not always optimal to delegate.
3.3 Complete delegation and second period delegation
Finally, we mention the two other possible allocations of decision rights: the complete
delegation and the second period delegation. These cases have in common that there is
no problem of information transmission from the agent to the principal. Under complete
delegation, the agent takes his preferred decisions d1 and d2:
d1 = ®1 + µ (14)
d2 = ®2 + µ (15)
The complete delegation of decision rights to the agent raises a problem of time con-
sistency: after observing d1, the principal has an incentive to retake from the agent the
control right over d2. Indeed, after observing d1, the principal learns the state of the world
µ. Delegating the second period decision has no bene¯t but just a cost18. Therefore, if
the principal cannot commit to the allocation of decision right over d2 to the agent19,h e
will anticipate that the allocation of decision will be changed. If there is no commitment
to the allocation of the second decision, the case of complete delegation is identical to the
case of delegation20.
18Except if the interests over d2 are perfectly congruent.
19Aghion and Tirole [1997] study this particular problem of commitment in a given organizational
structure.
20For the remaining of the paper, when we speak about complete delegation, we assume that the
principal can commit to a given allocation of decision rights.
11If the principal delegates only d2, she takes d1 according to (1) (as under centralization)
and the agent takes d2 according to (15) (as in complete delegation). In this case, only
the second decision is taken by an informed party. Second period delegation is equivalent
to a one period model where information transmission plays no role.
4 Optimal organizational structure
When the principal delegates some decision to the agent, she su®ers a loss of control
because the agent doesn't have the same preferences over decisions. But, on the other
hand, the agent is better informed about the state of the world and delegated decisions
are taken on the basis of better information. Moreover, when the principal delegates d1,
information is transferred from the agent to the principal (proposition 1). Delegation has
a bene¯t as well as a cost. The bene¯ts are linked to the information, the cost to the
divergence of interests. The relative value of information compared to the loss of control
determines the optimal orgnizational structure.
To clarify the choice between the four possible allocations of decision rights, we ¯rst
de¯ne the loss of control associated with delegation as the di®erence between the expected
utility of an informed principal and the expected utility of the principal under delegation.
De¯nition 3 The costs associated with delegation of d1 are measured by:
CD1 = EUP(Principal informed) ¡ EUP(Delegation of d1)
As in both cases, the decisions are taken by an informed party, we abstract from infor-
mational gains that can be produced by delegation
In the case of free lunch signals when ¢µ ¸j ® 2¡¯ 2 j , the costs of delegation are a
simple quadratic function of the divergence of interests: CD1 =
(®1¡¯1)2
2
When signals are costly, the agent takes a decision that is not his preferred one in
order to transmit his information to the principal. This di®erentiation can bene¯t or cost
the principal depending on i) the direction of preferences and ii) the magnitude of the
change.
In the case where ®2 ¡ ¯2 ¸ ¢µ, d1(µ2)=® 1+µ 2+
p
K 1¡¢ µ>® 1+µ 2 . This
increases in d1(µ2) bene¯ts to the principal if (i) ¯1 >® 1which means that the principal's
ideal point is greater than those of the agent and (ii) the increase in d1(µ2)21 is not too
big compared to ¯1 ¡ ®1. Using our de¯nition, the costs of delegation associated with
























K 1¡¢ µ¯rst increases and then decreases on the interval [0;® 2¡¯ 2] with
f( 0 )=0=f( ® 2¡¯ 2).
12For small values of ¢µ, the costs of delegation (and hence the choice of the organi-
zational form) depend not only on the distance between the principal's and agents ideal
points but also on the direction of preferences22. The fact that signals are costly for the
agent can indeed bene¯t to the principal if it forces the agent to take a decision closest
to her preferred one. This is another interesting property of delegated decisions.
Now we can turn to the optimal organizational structure. The preferred repartition of
decision right is the one who gives the highest expected utility to the principal. It is given
in the following (technical) proposition and represented in ¯gure 1 for the case ®2 ¸ ¯2.
Comparative static results are summarized in corollaries 1, 2 and 3.
Proposition 2 The optimal organization is:
to delegate d1 if:
CD1 · v1v2¢µ
2 (16)
and if (®2 ¡ ¯2)2 · v1v2¢µ2, the following additional condition is required:
(®1 ¡ ¯1)
2 ¡ (®2 ¡ ¯2)
2 · v1v2¢µ
2 (17)















































































Figure 1: The optimal organizational structure
22When the costs of delegation are greater than
(®1¡¯1)
2
2 , the principal can decrease them by o®ering
a random delegation mechanism to the agent. In such a mechanism, the agent receives control right over
d2 with a probability p<1. In that case, the right hand side of the binding incentive constraint IC0
i is
multiplied by (1 ¡ p). And hence, Ki decreases and the costs of delegation decreases. The drawback of
the random delegation mechanism is that the principal gives control right over d2 with probability p and




13Corollary 1 For large ¢µ, some form of delegation is optimal. If j®1 ¡ ¯1j is large
compared to j®2 ¡ ¯2j, the principal delegates d2 only, otherwise she delegates d1:
When ¢µ is large, the agent's information has a great value. It is important for the
principal to have informed decisions which imply that delegation is optimal. She delegates
d2 in the case where the costs of delegating d1 is large relative to the costs of delegating
d2: Notice also that when ¢µ is large, the agent's can transfer their information at no
cost.
Corollary 2 For small ¢µ, the optimal organizational structure is either to delegate d1
or centralization. The choice depends on (i) the distance between ®1 and ¯1 and (ii) the
sign of the di®erence (®1 ¡ ¯1).
When ¢µ is small, it is more di±cult for the agent to transfer his information to the
principal. This di±culty leads to more extreme decisions than in the case of a high ¢µ.
More extreme decisions bene¯ts to the principal only if, an informed principal would have
been more extreme than the agent. This explains why when for a given j®1 ¡ ¯1j,w h e n
the interests go in the same direction, the principal delegates more often and when they
go in opposite direction, she delegates less.
Corollary 3 When ®1 = ®2 and ¯1 = ¯2, the optimal organizational structure is delega-
tion if CD1 · v1v2¢µ2 and centralization otherwise.
If both decisions have the same importance, if the principal delegates, she delegates d1:
In this particular case, the costs of delegation are identical when the principal delegates d1
or d2 and hence, if it is optimal to delegate, the principal prefer delegate the ¯rst decision.
In proposition 1, we have shown that delegation is going together with a transfer
of information from the better informed agent to the principal. This communication of
information through decision is important for the principal because she can implement
her preferred second decision d2. The drawbacks is that she has to allow the agent to
take his preferred decision d1. The main di®erence between this simple contract who just
specify who decide and the standard contract is that the principal cannot reward and
punish some type of agent. In the standard contracting framework, the principal extract
the hidden information by paying some rent to the agent who has an incentive to lie. Here
by contrast, if the principal wants to extract information, she has to delegate d1 to the
agent and the agent enjoys rents in both state of the world. In our model, the rents are
the private bene¯ts of taking his preferred decision. But these rents are not conditional
on µ, and this make this kind of contract more costly than the standard contracts. In the
next section, we study how the principal can diminish these rents by constraining agent's
choice.
5 Restricting agent's discretion: the case of rules
When the principal leaves some power to the agent, she would like to reduce the discretion
of the agent by imposing some constraints on the choice of the subordinate. Constraining
14the choice of the agent appears to be a useful way to reduce the cost of delegation while
preserving what we called the bene¯ts of information. To reduce the discretion of the
agent, the principal may constraint the agent to choose d1 within a given subset L.B y
doing so, we will say that the principal imposes a rule that limits the discretion of the
agent in the choice of d1. We de¯ne a rule as a compulsory requirement that must be
followed when the principal delegates the decision rights over d1: Our interest in this
subsection is to see how the principal can e®ectively reduces the cost of delegation by
imposing such a rule and to compute the optimal way of doing so, what we call the
optimal rule.
The emergence of rule that lowers the power of incentives is a fundamental charac-
teristic of any organization (see for example Martimort [1997]). Here by contrast, we
describes rules that keep the delegated decision informative. In that sense, our work is to
¯nd how to reduce the agent's discretion and preserve the incentives to signal the infor-
mation through his decision. Our work is related to Armstrong [1994]23 who studies how
reducing agent's discretion may increase overall organization's performance.
Constraining the choice of the agent may be done in a variety of ways. We will restrict
our attention to rules that are formed of a connected subset of possible decisions d1.
Assumption 1 A rule is a connected subset L of the possible decisions d1.
Choosing a rule for the principal is to choose the boundaries l and l of the subset L = h
l;l
i
. To do the analysis, we have to assume that the principal can enforce the rule. i.e.
She can e®ectively constraint the choice of the agent24. Another important assumption,
that follows directly from our contractual restrictions, is that the rule cannot be state
contingent. In other words, the subset L is independent of µ.
The optimal rule depends on how the agent acts when he receives control right over
d1. To compute it, we distinguish two cases: the case of costless signals where, without
rules, the agent implements his preferred decision in both states of the world25 and the
case where one incentive constraint binds (case of costly signals).
5.1 Rule in the case of free lunch signals
The following lemma reduces the set of possible rules:
Lemma 2 Without loss of generality, we can restrict our attention to rules of the form
[0;l], with ®1 + µ1 · l · ®1 + µ2, when ¯1 is smaller than ®1. While when ¯1 >® 1,w e
can consider, wlog, only rules of the form [l;+1[ with ®1 + µ2 ¸ l ¸ ®1 + µ1.
Proof: Appendix
As it appears from lemma 2, the rules takes a di®erent form if ®1 is greater or smaller
than ¯1. This corresponds to the case where the agent takes a greater/ smaller decision
23Armstrong's main results is to show that the discretion of the agent is reduced when there is a greater
risk of (the agent and the principal) having diverging interest over policies.
24But the agent has still the possibility of quitting the organization.
25This correspond to the case where ¢µ ¸j ® 2¡¯ 2j .
15than an informed principal would have taken. The reaction of the principal di®ers in the
two situations: in one case, it is important to decrease the agent's decision, in the other
case, it is important to increase it. In the paper, we treat the case in which the principal
wants to decreases the decision of the agent (case where ®1 >¯ 1 ) 26. The other case is
symmetric and can be easily be computed with our analysis.
Reaction of the agent to the rule. The following proposition describes the decisions
of the agent when the principal imposes a rule of the type described in lemma 2:
Proposition 3 When the principal imposes a rule to the agent, his equilibrium decisions
are:
d1(µ2)=l (20)
² When ¯2 ¡ ®2 · ¢µ
2 :
d1(µ1)=® 1+µ 1 (21)
² When ¢µ
2 · ¯2 ¡ ®2 · ¢µ




H ( l ) if l · ~ l (23)






®2 ¡ ¯2 +¢ µand H(l)=( ® 1¡l ) 2¡2 lµ2+2(® 2¢µ+
¯ 2¢µ+® 1µ 2+¯ 2µ 2+µ 2µ 1)¡µ2
1 And H(l) is a monotone and decreasing function
with H(~ l)=¢ µ .
proof: appendix
In state µ2, the agent selects the decision that is closest to his ideal point within the
allowed subset. This decision is the upper bound of the subset L. In state µ1, the agent
selects the decision gives him the highest utility and such that IC02 is satis¯ed. This
decision is either ®1 + µ1 or given by the constraint27.
The value ~ l is the smallest value of l that keeps the decisions d1(µ1)=® 1+ µ 1;d 1(µ 2)=l
incentive compatible and is derived from (IC0
2). When l<~ l , if the agent wants to reveal
his information in state µ1, his decision is not is preferred one. So, imposing a rule may
change the agent's decision in both state of the world.
Limits to the imposition of rules (I): incentive constraint The ¯rst limit to the
imposition of rules is the preservation of information transmission by the agent. The
agent µ1 has an incentive to misrepresent his type when ®2 ¡ ¯2 ¸ ¢µ
2 . In that case, µ2
cannot di®erentiate himself from µ1 by taking a higher decision. Therefore, the rule pre-
serves information transmission if its upper bound l is such that the incentive compatible
condition IC0
1 is satis¯ed.
26We will also assume for expositional simplicity that ¯1 + µ2 >® 1+µ 1.
27IC0
2 is always slack if ¯2 ¡ ®2 · ¢µ
2 . When this condition is not satis¯ed, IC0
2 i ss l a c ki fi ti st o o
costly for µ2 to copy µ1, i.e. l is su±ciently large (see corollary 4).
16Corollary 4 When ¢µ








2®2 ¡2¯2 ¡¢µ (24)
This equation is derived by solving for l, the following incentive compatible condition:
U
A(µ1;d 1(µ 1)=® 1+µ 1;d 2(µ 1)=¯ 2+µ 1)¸U
A( µ 1;d 1(µ 2)=l;d2(µ2)=¯ 2+µ 2)
.
Limits to the imposition of rules (II): participation constraints As the rule
pushes down the decision of the agent in at least one state of the world, we have to check
that the constrained decision leaves a positive utility to the agent in both states of the
world µ1 and µ2. The agent's participation constraint limits the possibilities of restricting
the agent's discretion.
The optimal rule We can now compute the optimal rule that preserves agent's partic-
ipation and information transmission. We identify the optimal rule with its upper bound
l¤. The optimal rule is the rule that minimize the resulting costs of delegation and is





s.t. l ¸ l
IC0
1 and the behavior of the agent as a function of l is described in proposition 3.
Lemma 3 The optimal rule can have three possible forms:
RULE A: l¤ = ¯1 + µ2
RULE B: Choose l¤ = maxl UP, such that l¤ 2 [®1 + µ1;~ l]. If an interior maximum
exists it is given by:
v1
·







= ¡v2(¯1 + µ2 ¡ l¤) (25)
RULE C: l¤ = l
IC0
1.
With rule A, the interests of the principal and the agent completely coincide in state
µ2. If there is no modi¯cation in d1(µ1), which is the case if ¯1 + µ2 is greater than ~ l, the
costs of delegation are reduced to: v1
(®1¡¯1)2
2 . With rule A, delegation is costly only in
state µ1.
With rule B, the principal reduces agent's decisions in both state of the world. As
we know, d1(µ1)=® 1+µ 2¡
q
H ( l ) and d1(µ2)=lwhen l<~ l , the rule B selects the
combination of d1(µ1) and d1(µ2) that maximizes the principal's utility.
With rule C, the principal selects the highest incentive compatible rule.
Proposition 4 The optimal rule l¤ is such that:
17² If j®2 ¡ ¯2j·¢ µ
2 , the optimal rule is rule A
² If ¢µ
2 · ®2 ¡ ¯2 · ¢µ and , the optimal rule is rule A if ¯1 + µ2 ¸ l
IC0
1 and rule C
otherwise.
² If ¢µ
2 · ¯2 ¡ ®2 · ¢µ, the optimal rule is rule B if ~ l ¸ ¯1 + µ2 and rule A or rule
Bi f~ l·¯ 1+µ 2.
The ¯rst case corresponds to the case where the agent never mimics the other type.
Hence, the principal cannot only constraint the agent in state µ2 and forces him to take
her preferred decision28.
In the second case, the agent µ1 mimics µ2 if d1(µ2)=lis close enough to ®1 + µ1.
Therefore the principal can force µ2 to take her preferred decision only if ¯1+µ2 is greater
than l
IC0




In the third case, the agent µ2 will mimic µ1 if l is close enough to ®1 + µ1.I f¯ 1+ µ 2
is smaller than ~ l, the optimal rule is to set l
¤ 2 [®1 + µ1;~ l] in order to maximize the
principal's utility. In that case, the principal decreases agent's decision in both state of
the world. If ~ l is smaller than ¯1 + µ2, the principal can either use rule A and constraint
the agent to take is preferred decision in state µ2 or constraint the agent to take a decision
d1(µ2) smaller than ¯1 +µ2 in order to decrease the decision d1(µ1). In between these two
strategies, the principal selects the rule that maximize her expected utility.
Costs of delegation with constrained decisions We have seen that constraining
decisions is done (optimally) by setting an upper limit on the choice of the agent. With
constrained delegation there is still a transfer of information. Imposing a rule is useful
only if it diminishes the associated costs of delegation.
Observation 1 Restricting agent's discretion decreases the associated loss of control
without suppressing them.
For example if the optimal rule is rule A, the agent chooses the principal's preferred
decision in state µ2 but select his preferred decision in state µ1. So there is a loss of control
in state µ1. With rule A, the costs of delegation are equal to v1
(®1¡¯1)2
2
As we mentioned at the end of the previous section, the drawbacks associated with
delegation, the loss of control, are greater when contracts are limited to simple right to
decide contracts than under standard complete contract µ a la Baron-Myerson because the
rents received by the agent are not conditional on their type. If the principal is able to
constraint the choice of the agent, she can reduce the rent paid by the agent at least in one
state of the world. But this ability to constraint the agent is restricted by the necessity
of keeping the decisions informative. If the principal restricts 'too much' the discretion of
the agent, the incentive constraints may not be satis¯ed and delegation looses its property
of revealing information. As the loss of control decrease when delegation is accompanied
with rules, the space parameter for which delegation is optimal is greater.
28If ¯2 >® 1+µ 1, the optimal rule is l
¤
= ®1 + µ1 + ².
185.2 Rules in the case of costly signals
When the signals are costly for the agent, we perform the same analysis to derive the
optimal rule. Again we suppose that ®1 >¯ 1, so the goal of the principal is the rule is to
reduce agent's decisions.
When ®1 >¯ 1and ®2 ¡ ¯2 ¸ ¢µ, no rule is the optimal rule. When ®2 ¡ ¯2 ¸ ¢µ,
the decision d1(µ2) is greater than agent µ2 ideal point. In this case, if the principal set
a rule at any level smaller than d1(µ2), the only e®ect is to bunch the decision of both
agents at l. Therefore any rule will destroy the informative content of delegated decision.
When ¯2 ¡ ®2 ¸ ¢µ, imposing a rule reduces both decision. If such a reduction
decreases the costs of delegation imposing a rule is optimal otherwise, it is better to leave
the choice of the agent unconstrained.
6 Robustness and extensions
6.1 More than two types
An important result of this paper is to show that delegated decisions have an informational
content: the principal learns the state of the world when she delegates d1 to the agent. This
result is constructed using the properties of signaling games and especially the intuitive
criterion. Now we would like to discuss the robustness of this result when there are more
than two states of the world. With N ¸ 2, the results of proposition 1 are extended in
the following proposition:
Proposition 5 With N types, the only surviving equilibrium is the least costly separating
equilibrium.
Proof: see Appendix
Our results are robust when the problem is extended to more than two states of the
world29: delegated decisions signals µ to the principal.
These results should be contrasted with the results of Crawford and Sobel where the
equilibrium of their signalling game is a partition equilibrium in which the agent introduce
noise in the message send to the principal. In Crawford Sobel, the agent has an interest to
hide at least partially the information he possess. If the agent discloses his information,
the decision taken by the principal does not correspond to the agent's ideal decision, so
there is an incentive not to disclose perfectly the information. In our model, in some
state, the agent doesn't have this incentive to misrepresent his information. Even if the
agent's and principal's ideal points do not coincide, when the state of the world is low
(high), they both prefer smaller (greater) decisions. And this e®ect is enough to make the
decision perfectly informative. But even if information is transmitted when the principal
29The key point is not the number of state but the gap between two adjacent values of µ: µi ¡ µi¡1.
When this di®erence is too small, for example if there is a continuum of µ, all the incentive constraints
are binding and the decisions of all types (but the highest one) are distorted downward. And this in turn
may create a participation problem for the lowest types. As long as all the type participate, proposition
5 is valid.
19delegates, the costs (loss of control) associated with delegation may be extremely high for
the principal, so delegation is not necessary the optimal organizational form.
6.2 Cheap talks and message games
If the principal keeps control rights over decisions, the agent may want to transfer (part
of) his information to the decider. This informal communication by the agent changes
the principal's beliefs about the state of the world and then changes the decisions. In-
formal communication from the informed party to the decider may be an alternative to
delegation30. The problem with communication is that it is only strategic: the aim of the
communication is to manipulate principal's beliefs. The agent wants to communicate not
the true information but the information that, used by the principal,fosters his interest.
Cheap talks equilibria are described in Crawford Sobel [1982]: for a continuum of types,
the equilibria are partition equilibria where a (continuous) subset of types sends the same
message. In the discrete case, the equilibria are probability distributions over a ¯xed
number of messages.
If the agent can signal his information when he receives control right over d1,i ti s
not anymore the case when he wants to signal it through pre play communication. For
example, if one type of agent prefers a non informed principal (centralization) to an
informed principal, this type of agent can communicate exactly the same information as
the other type would have done and hence, the principal learns nothing with this pre
play communication. By contrast, giving control right to agent is enough to extract his
information. Decisions are better signals than communication. As communication is only
partial, the principal cannot enjoy the full bene¯ts of information.
The main di®erence between cheap talks and delegation asaam e a nt oe xtract agent's
hidden information is that delegation is costly for the agent: he should take a decision that
has direct consequences on his utility. Therefore separation of type is feasible. By contrast,
transferring information in cheap talk games has no direct cost. It only changes the beliefs
of the principal and hence, communication is used by the agent only to manipulate the
principal's beliefs.
7 Conclusion
The main message of this paper is to show that when contracts µ a la Baron Myerson
are prohibited, the principal can still extract information from the agent by delegating
the choice of projects to the agent. Using the properties of signalling games, we have
shown that delegation is an alternative to contracting. If delegation has the advantage of
extracting agent's information, it has also some costs (loss of control). So we have shown
that the principal will not always use this delegation-revelation mechanism, especially
if the agent's information has little value (¢µ is small) or if the divergence of interest
(j®1 ¡ ¯1j) is large.
The main di®erence between the standard complete contract framework and the model
30The problem of cheap talks versus delegation is treated in Dessein [1999]. The main di®erence with
this paper is that he doesn't consider delegation as a mean to extract information.
20developed in this paper is that the principal cannot control the rents she pays to the
agent. In the complete contract framework, rents are function of the agent's report of
his private information and the principal can elicit information by paying higher rents to
e±cient agents. In our incomplete contract framework, the rents paid by the principal
are unconditional on the type. The rents received by the agent is the utility he has
when he is in charge of the ¯rst decision. The unconditionallity of the rents increases the
costs of information for the principal. We have shown that the principal can reduce the
costs of delegation (and therefore agent's rents) by reducing his discretion but she cannot
completely suppress these loss of control.
These results should be contrasted with another result from complete contract theory :
the existence of pooling contract in multi-period adverse selection models (ratchet e®ect).
In these models, a separating equilibrium where the agent reveals his information at
the beginning of the ¯rst period does not always exist31. By contrast we have shown
that delegation is going together with (perfect) information revelation. By giving full
discretion to the agent, a type can use this freedom to di®erentiate from the other when
he fears to be copied. Suppose that both types prefers to be taken for (say) µ2. In the
complete (dynamic) contract framework, the principal will pay a bonus for the agent that
reveal a type µ1. But the bonus may be too large and the other incentive constraint
may not be longer satisfy resulting in a pooling equilibrium. In our delegation-revelation
mechanism, if both prefers to be taken for µ2, the type µ2 will take a decision that is not
is preferred one but such that mimicking is too costly for µ1. So one hand, in a complete
contract framework, information revelation is achieved by paying bonus to e±cient agents,
on the other hand, in delegated mechanism, di®erentiation is achieved by self-imposed
penalties (lost utility). Delegation can be used to extract private information in multi-
period game32.
Another message from the paper is that when delegation occurs in organization, the
principal doesn't leave full control to the subordinate. In our model it is optimal to
delegate only one decision, and let the principal decide on the remaining decisions. This
paper advocates for a split in decision rights between the informed subordinate and the
principal. Some decisions are delegated in order to extract information the other are not
in order to mitigate loss of control.
31See Freixas et al [1985]
32Another major di®erence is that our model is a private bene¯t model where we can ignore participa-
tion constraints while they are important in complete contract framework.
21A Complement to section 3.2
A.1 Separating equilibria: cases S.2 and S.3
Case S.2: the set of separating equilibrium is:
d
¤





1(µ2)=® 1 + µ 2 (27)
This equilibrium is supported by pessimistic beliefs: ¹(µ1jd1)=0 ; 8d 1 6 =d ¤
1 ( µ 1 ) and
¹(µ1jd¤
1(µ1)) = 1.
The set D is the set of decisions that satisfy the participation constraint for type µ1 and
the constraint IC0
2: D ´]0;® 1+µ 2¡
p
K 2][[® 1+µ 2+
p
K 2;+1[; K2 =( 2 ¯ 2¡ 2 ® 2¡ ¢ µ )¢µ.
Again, we use the intuitive criterion. It re¯nes all the beliefs associated with D to
¹(µ1jd1 2 D) = 1 and the surviving equilibrium is d¤





Case S.3: When j®2 ¡ ¯2j·¢ µ
2 , a possible separating equilibrium is33:
d
¤
1(µ1)=® 1 + µ 1 (28)
d
¤
1(µ2) 2 D ´f d 1( µ 2) j IC
0
1g (29)
With beliefs ¹(µ1jd1)=1 ,8d 16 =d ¤
1( µ 2) and ¹(µ1jd¤
1(µ2)) = 0 We use the intuitive criterion
to re¯ne beliefs and the only surviving equilibrium is: d¤
1(µ1)=® 1+µ 1,d ¤
1( µ 2)=® 1+µ 2.
A.2 Pooling equilibria: cases P.2 and P.3
The case P.2 is symmetric to P.1. The set of pooling equilibria is the set of d¤
1 such that:















A(µ 2;d 1;d 2 =¯ 2+µ 2) (31)
(30) is equivalent to d¤




C]; C = v1¢µ(2¯2 ¡ 2®2 +
(1 + v2)¢µ) and (31) is equivalent to d¤
1 2 D4 ´ [®1 + µ2 ¡
p
D;®1 + µ2 +
p
D]; D =
v1¢µ(2¯2¡2®2¡v1¢µ). The set D of pooling equilibria is the intersection of D3 and D4.
We use the following lemma, similar to lemma 1:
Lemma 4 8 d¤
1, 9 ~ d1 such that:
(i) µ2 prefers the pooling equilibrium d¤
1 to ~ d1, whatever the beliefs associated with ~ d1
(ii) µ1 prefers ~ d1 to the pooling equilibrium if the principal is convicted that ¹(µ1j~ d1)=1 .
The proof is similar to lemma 1, and with this lemma, we can show that in case P.2, no
equilibrium survives the intuitive criterion.
33There is another separating equilibrium where d¤
1(µ2)=® 1+µ 2. The reasoning in this case is similar.
22In case P.3, The set of pooling equilibria is the set of d¤















A(µ 2;d 1;d 2 =¯ 2+v 1µ 1+v 2µ 2) (33)
and we use the intuitive criterion in the same way as before to eliminate all the pooling
equilibria.
B Proof of lemma 1
To each d¤
1, we can associate a ~ d1 de¯ned as:
U





2 =¯ 2+Eµ) (34)
~ d1 >® 1+µ 2
~ d 1 is the decision d1 that left the agent µ2 indi®erent between the pooling equilibrium
(d¤
1;d ¤
2) and (~ d1;¯ 2+µ 2). So part (ii) of the lemma is satis¯ed34.A sµ 2prefers to signal
his type, the function on the right hand side of (34) is a vertical translation of the function
on the left hand side. Therefore, ~ d1 always exist (actually two values ~ d1 satis¯es (34) by
the single peakness assumption but we select those on the right of ®1 + µ2).
Now we concentrate on part (i) of the lemma. It is satis¯ed if, whatever the beliefs







A( µ 1;~ d 1;d 2) (35)
If the beliefs associated with ~ d1 are ¹(µ1j~ d1) = 1, the condition (35) is satis¯ed. In




2 to d2 = ¯2 + µ1, by de¯nition of case P.1.
If the beliefs associated with ~ d1 are ¹(µ1j~ d1)=v 1, the condition (35) is also satis¯ed.
~ d1 is greater than d¤
1 and the second decision is identical. Therefore, µ1 prefers the initial
equilibrium.
If the beliefs associated with ~ d1 are ¹(µ1j~ d1) = 0, there is as in the previous case a
cost of taking a decision greater than d¤
1, but there may be bene¯ts if the agent prefers
the second decision d2 = ¯2 + µ2 to d¤
2. This is the case if 2®2 ¡ 2¯2 ¡ (1 + v2)¢µ ¸ 0.
And we will now concentrate on these cases. For the reasoning, it is important to note
that these bene¯ts (the increase in UA when the principal takes d2 = ¯2 +µ2 rather than
d2 = ¯2 + Eµ) are constant, i.e. independent of the initial equilibrium d¤
1 and equals to
v1¢µ
2 (2®2 ¡ 2¯2 ¡ (1 + v2)¢µ). Therefore, we have to look at the cost of switching from
d¤
1 to ~ d1 for µ1 and check if they exceed the bene¯ts. For simplicity, we ¯rst concentrate
on pooling equilibria on the right of ®1 + µ2, those in the subset of D0 of D; D0 ´
[®1 + µ2;® 1+µ 1+
p
A]. We use the following lemma:
Lemma 5 The cost of switching from d¤
1 2 D0 to the associated ~ d1 increases with d¤
1.
34To have strict preference take ~ d1 + ².
35whatever the initial d¤
1 even those smaller than ®1 + µ1
23Proof: Solving (34) for ~ d1 and taking the value greater than ®1 + µ,w eh a v e~ d 1as a
function of the equilibrium d¤
1:





1(®2 + µ2)+C (36)
where C =( ® 1+µ 2) 2+2 v 1¢ µ( ® 2¡¯ 2)+v 2
1( µ 1+µ 2) 2.
With some algebra, we can show that @ ~ d1
@d¤
1 ¸ 0 and @@~ d1
@@d¤
1 > 0 for all d¤
1 2 D0.
On the other hand, the derivative of UA(µ1) with respect to d1 is equal to ®1 + µ1 ¡ d1.
For all d1 >® 1+µ 1, the impact (on utility) of a given change in d1, is greater the greater
d1 is. Combining these two elements: the impact of a change in d¤
1 on ~ d1 and the impact
of a change in ~ d1 on UA, it is straightforward to show that the cost of switching from
d¤
1 2 D0 to ~ d1 is greater, the greater the initial equilibrium is. And this proves the lemma.
Therefore, the condition (35) is satis¯ed for all d¤
1 2 D0 if it is satis¯ed for d¤
1 = ®1+µ2
(remember that the bene¯ts of switching are constant). Replacing d¤
1 by ®2 + µ2 and ~ d1
by (36), (35) becomes (after simpli¯cations):
¢µ(v1¢µ +
q
¢µv1(2®2 ¡ 2¯2 + v1¢µ)) > 0
which is always positive since we considered cases in which ®2 >¯ 2and hence, for all d¤
1
in D0, 9 ~ d1 satisfying the conditions of lemma 1.
Now consider the remaining equilibria in D,i fµ 2switch from d¤
1 to ~ d1 = ®1 + µ2 + q
2v1¢µ(®2 ¡ ¯2)+v 2
1( µ 1+µ 2) 2, such a deviation increases (strictly) his utility if the
beliefs associated with ~ d1 are ¹(µ1j~ d1)=0 .F o rµ 1, the cost of switching from d¤
1 to ~ d1 is
the sum of the cost of switching from d¤
1 to ®1+µ2 plus the cost of switching from ®1+µ2
to ~ d1. Then the costs of switching from any d¤
1 2 D, d¤
1 <® 1+µ 2are greater than the
costs associated with d¤
1 = ®1+µ2 and therefore greater than the bene¯ts. And this prove
lemma 1.
C Proof of proposition 2
To prove the proposition, we ¯rst compute the di®erence between the expected utility of
the principal under all forms of delegation and the expected utility under centralization.
EU









2 ¡ (®2 ¡ ¯2)
2)
EU
P(Complete Delegation) ¡ EU




2 +( ® 2¡¯ 2)
2)
The optimal organizational structure is the one with the highest di®erence (if positive)
and centralization if all these di®erences are negative.
We ¯rst show that complete delegation is always dominated: if CD1 =
(®1¡¯1)2
2 , which
is the case when ¢µ ¸j ® 2¡¯ 2 j , complete delegation is dominated by delegation d1.





smaller than v1v2¢µ2, which means that centralization dominates complete delegation.
24Delegation d2 dominates centralization if v1v2¢µ2 ¸ (®2 ¡ ¯2)2.
Delegation d1 dominates centralization if v1v2¢µ2 ¸ CD1
When delegation d1 and delegation d2 both dominate centralization, delegation d1
dominates if36:
(®1 ¡ ¯1)
2 ¡ (®2 ¡ ¯2)
2 ¸ v1v2¢µ
D Proof of lemma 2
If ®1 is greater than ¯1, the agent takes a decision greater than the principal's ideal point
in both state of the world. Therefore, the objective of the rule is to decrease the agent's
decisions. We show that the only possibility of decreasing agent's decision is to set the
upper bound of L smaller (or equal to) than ®1 + µ2.
If ®1 + µ1;® 1+µ 2 2L, the decisions are unchanged compared to the no rule case and
the rule is ine®ective.
If the lower bound l is greater than ®1 + µ1, the decision d1(µ1) will be greater than
in the no rule case. This kind of rule bene¯ts to the principal only if there is a decrease
in d1(µ2) that compensate the utility lost due to the increase in d1(µ1). We have to look
at the equilibrium decisions when the agent must choose d1 ¸ l. Whatever d1(µ1), the
agent µ2 has two possibilities: either he takes d1(µ2)=d 1( µ 1), or he takes a decision d1(µ2)
that satis¯es the incentive constraint IC0
1. This incentive compatible decision d1(µ2) will
be greater or equal to ®1 + µ2. Therefore setting l >® 1+µ 1results in either a pooling
equilibrium or in an increase in d1(µ1) and no decrease in d1(µ2). Hence, such a rule
doesn't bene¯t the principal.
Then the only rule that potentially bene¯ts the principal is to set the upper bound of
L smaller or equal than ®1 + µ2. In this case, d1(µ2) decreases. The resulting equilibrium
decisions will be either a pooling equilibrium (a situation which is bad for the principal)
or in a separating equilibrium where d1(µ1) doesn't increase compared to the no rule case
(a situation that bene¯ts to the principal).
Last, we have to show that the principal has no advantages in specifying a lower bound
of L smaller than ®1 + µ1. By doing so, the principal can limit the decrease in d1(µ1) (if
any). But as we will show in proposition 3, the only potential e®ect is to suppress the
existence of a separating equilibrium.
When ®1 is greater than ¯1, the same reasoning applies and the only rule to consider
are: [l;+1[, with l ¸ ®1 + µ1.
E Proof of proposition 3
From proposition 1, we know that the only equilibrium that survives the intuitive cri-
terion is the least costly separating equilibrium. In proposition 3, we describe the LCS
equilibrium of the game when ®1 >¯ 1and the rule is [0;l].




25Given d1(µ1), the type µ2 chooses either d1(µ2)=d 1( µ 1) or his preferred decision within
L. This latter case corresponds to the decision in L closest to ®1 +µ2 and is given by the
upper bound of L: l.
Given that d1(µ2)=l , the type µ1 chooses his preferred decision that satis¯es the
constraint IC0
2.S o d 1 ( µ 1 ) equals ®1 + µ1 if for (d1(µ1);d 1(µ 2) )=( ® 1+ µ 1 ; l ), IC0
2 is
satis¯ed. This is the case if: j®2 ¡ ¯2j·¢ µ
2 or if ¢µ
2 · ¯2 ¡ ®2 · ¢µ37 and l ¸ ~ l =






®2 ¡ ¯2 +¢ µ.
When ¢µ
2 · ¯2 ¡ ®2 · ¢µ and l · ~ l, IC0
2 is binding and the decision d1(µ1) is given by
this constraint. Solving IC0
2 for d1(µ1) we found that:
d1(µ1)=® 1+µ 2¡
q
H ( l ) (37)
With H(l)=( ® 1¡l ) 2¡2 lµ2 +2 ( ® 2µ 1+¯ 2¢ µ+® 1µ 2+¯ 2µ 2+µ 2µ 1)¡µ 2
1. This function
decreases when the upper bound of L decreases: H0(l)=2 l¡2(®1+µ2) which is negative
for all l<® 1+µ 2. Therefore, if l is smaller than ~ l, d1(µ1) decreases when l decreases.
Using a similar argument as in the proof of proposition 1, we can show that this
equilibrium is the only one who satis¯es the intuitive criterion. For the moment, we
didn't check if the solution described in 3 satis¯es the constraint IC0
1 i.e. check that it
is indeed optimal for µ1 to di®erentiate from µ2 rather than mimicking him and selecting
d1(µ1)=l . This is done in corollary 4.
F Proof proposition 5
F.1 Elimination of pooling equilibria
Suppose that the state of the world parameter belongs to a set £ ´f µ 1;µ 2;:::;µNg with
µ1 <µ 2<: : :<µ N. Consider an equilibrium in which in some state of the world, the
agent takes an identical decision d¤
1. To prove proposition 5, we show that any of these
pooling (or partial pooling) equilibrium survive the intuitive criterion.
Our proof runs as follow: we ¯rst show that when ®2 <¯ 2, the lowest type µ1 cannot
be in the pooling. Then we show that the second lowest type µ2 cannot be in the pooling
and by recurrence we show that no pooling equilibrium survives the intuitive criterion38.
If ®2 <¯ 2, the lowest type µ1 has an incentive to deviate from any pooling equilibrium
because µ1 always prefer d2 = ¯2 + µ1 to the decision d¤
2 associated with the pooling
equilibrium. After observing a ¯rst decision d¤





where I is the subset of £ in which the agent takes d¤
1 and ¹i(µijd¤
1) are the posterior beliefs
after observing d¤
1. It is straightforward to show that d¤
2 is greater than ¯2 + µ1, and as
®2 <¯ 2:® 2+µ 1<¯ 2+µ 1<d ¤
2, then the agent µ1 prefers the separating decision to the
pooling one.
Let's de¯ne ~ d1 as:
U






37Remember that for the moment we consider only the case of free lunch signals when j®2 ¡ ¯2j·¢ µ
38In the case ¯2 <® 2, the reasoning is similar but we have to start by showing that the highest type
µN cannot be in the pooling and next that the second highest type cannot be in the pooling and e.t.c.
26~ d1 <® 1+µ 1
To show that µ1 cannot be in the pooling, we have to show that if µ1 switches from d¤
1 to
~ d1, the other types prefer the initial pooling equilibrium whatever the beliefs associated
with ~ d1. The type for which it is the least costly to switch from d¤
1 to ~ d1 is the type closest
to µ1, namely µ2.I fµ 2has no incentives to switch, all other types µ>µ 2will neither.
The proof is identical to what is done to derive proposition 1. If the costs of switching
exceed the bene¯ts for d¤
1 = ®1 + µ1, then they exceed bene¯ts for all d¤
1. The value of ~ d1
associated with d¤
1 = ®1 + µ1 is (we de¯ne d¤
2 = ¯2 + µ1 + X, X>0):
~ d1 = ®1 + µ1 ¡
q
2(¯2 ¡ ®2)X + X2 (39)
With some algebra we can show that µ2 does not bene¯t from a change of decision whatever
the beliefs associated with ~ d1
39.
This proves that the lowest type cannot belong to the pooling equilibrium. Now let's
suppose that second lowest type (µ2) pools with other types. In that case (when µ1 is out
of the pool but µ2 belongs to it), µ2 prefers the decision ¯2 +µ2 to the pooling decision d¤
2
because ®2 +µ2 <¯ 2+µ 2<d ¤
2. But then , µ2 can deviate to a decision ~ d1, and hence, no
pooling equilibrium including µ2 survives the intuitive criterion.
We proceed like this in all the cases to show that the lower type in a pooling equilibrium
has an incentive to quit the pool and if he switches to the associated ~ d1, he can signal his
type. Hence no pooling (or partial pooling) equilibrium survives the intuitive criterion.
F.2 Separating equilibria
When ®2 is smaller than ¯2, the relevant incentive constraints are the downward con-
straints: those who prevent agent µi of mimicking agent µi¡1. In a separating equilibrium,
d¤
2(µ)=¯ 2+ µ . The set of separating equilibrium decision d¤
































A ( µ 2 ;d
¤
1(µ 2);d 2(µ 2)) ¸ U
A(µ1;d
¤
1(µ 1);d 2(µ 1)) (43)
For example, equation (41) de¯nes a set D of decisions d¤
1(µN¡1) that are incentive com-
patible given d¤
1(µN). The intuitive criterion implies that all the beliefs associated with
a decision d1 2 D should be ¹(µN¡1jd1 2 D) = 1. And hence, the agent µN¡1 selects his
preferred decision within D.A n dd ¤
1 ( µ N ¡ 1 ) is either ®1 +µN¡1 or given by the constraint.
39The only beliefs to consider are: ¹(µ1j~ d1)=1o r¹ ( µ 2j~ d 1)=1 .
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